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VENDOR'S "DUTY" TO INSPECT CHATTELS
By

LAURENCE

H.

A REPLY

ELDREDGE'

In the March number of the Dickinson Law Review, Professor Donald J.
Faragc has crossed lances with me upon the question of the duty of a vendor of a
chattel to inspect it before selling it.' In my former article, 2 I -expressed the view
that it is socially undesirable to impose a duty of inspection upon a vendor (as distinct from the manufacturer or other creator) of a chattel. I also said that until
quite recently it has generally been thought that a vendor is not liable (in the
absence of a warranty) for harm caused by a defect "where he did not know it
existed or was not possessed of information which should have made him suspicious. " 3 Unfortunately, in Professor Farage's article his quotation of my view
as to the existing state of the law inadvertently omits the above quoted words.'
Professor Farage also overlooks my statement, "There may be a rare and exceptional
situation where a defect will cause a catastrophe and even an off chance that the
chattel may be defective is such as to demand some looking into by the vendor.
But such cases will be few and far between."
Aside from these qualifications,
Professor Farage accurately states my view that the vendor who has no knowledge
or suspicion that the chattel is dangerously defective, should not be required to make
an inspection to discover unknown defects. Professor Farage disagrees with this
and argues that the vendor should be under some duty of inspection, the extent
of which he does not make clear. The reader will have to arrive at his own conclusions concerning the relative weight and merit of these two opposing arguments.
If Professor Farage's article did no more than present a view which is opposed
to mine there would be no need for this reply; but he goes further and, in effect,
says that I have misunderstood the authorities which I cite and that I failed "to
cite a single case flatly holding for (my) views." 6 Such a statement cannot go
unchallenged.
*Professor of Law in the University of Pennsylvania and Visiting Professor of Law in Columbia
University; adviser, Restatement of Torts; author, Pennsylvania Annotations to Restatement, Torts,
and of various articles in legal periodicals.

SON

IFarage, Must a Vendor Inspect Chattels Before Their Sale?-An Answer (1941)
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2Eldredge, Vendor's Tort Liability (1941) 89 U. oF PA. L. REV, 306.
3Ibid at p. 322.
445 DICKINSON LAW REV. at p. 163.
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Secondly, Professor Farage draws certain analogies which seem to me to be
false analogies. I shall first discuss this point before referring to the actual decisions. Professor Farage says:
"In any event, I find difficulty in understanding why, although
the vendor is conceded by Mr. Eldredge to have sufficient economic
interest in his trade to justify the imposition of a duty to make a
'reasonable' inspection of the premises for the protection of customers, the same vendor is deemed not to have a sufficient economic interest in the same trade which may justify the imposition of a duty
to 'reasonably' inspect stock for the benefit of the same customers."
Professor Bohlen has suggested that there is a real distinction in the two
situations so far as this question of benefit is concerned. 8 Also, I do not believe
there is any true analogy between the duty of inspection of land owed by a
possessor of business premises to his business guest and the duty of the vendor
of a chattel to his customer. Certain well known affirmative duties of inspection
attach to the possession and use for business purposes of both land and chattels.
The analogy to the inspection duty of a possessor of land to his business guest is
found in the inspection duty of one who supplies chattels to be used for his own
business purposes, and which is sometimes referred to as the rule of Heaven v.
Pendeir.9 There are affirmative duties which attach to the possession of both land
and chattels, and which drop from the shoulders of the defendant when he doffs
the cloak of possession or ownership.
If an analogy, involving land, is sought to the vendor of a chattel, the closest
analogy is that of the vendor of land. Insofar as decided authority goes, it seems
clear that the vendor of land is under no duty to inspect it for the purpose of discovering defects which are dangerous to the purchaser or to persons coming upon
the land, or even to persons outside the boundaries of the land. 10 Indeed, it is
not clear whether the vendor of land is even under a duty to disclose known discoverable defects. As a general rule, when the vendor of land gives up title and
possession he ceases at that moment to be subject to liability for harm thereafter
caused by dangerous conditions upon the land, not created by his own active con71bid
at p. 160.
8

BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926), pp. 85-86.
See RESTATEMENT, TORTS, (1934) sec. 392.
91l Q.B.D. 503 (1883).

lOPersons off the premises: McQuillan v. Clark Thread Co., 172 At. 370 (N.J. 1934); Pal-

more v. Morris, Tasker & Co., 182 Pa. 82, 37 A. 995 (1897)

(leading case).

Persons on the

preinists: Stone v. Heyman Bros., 124 Cal. App. 46, 12 P. (2d) 126 (1932) ; Upp v. Darner, 150
Ia. 403, 130 N.W. 409 (1911); Slavitz v. Morris Park Estates, 98 N.Y. Misc. 314, 162 N.Y. Supp.
888 (1917); Kilmer v. White, 254 N.Y. 64, 171 N.E. 908 (1930); Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn.
347, 270 S.W. 66 (1925); Bottomley v. Bannister [19321 1 K.B. .58; Otto v. Bolton [1936
2 K.B. 46. See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS, (1934) sec. 352.
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duct. 11 If the person who sells land is under no duty to inspect' it to discover
dangerous defects lurking in it, and is not liable for harm caused after possession
and title have passed, I see no additional controlling reason for imposing upon
one who sells a chattel the duty to inspect it to discover dangerous defects.
The really serious charge which Professor Farage has leveled at me is that I
have misrepresented the state of the decided cases. He challenges my statement
that "In two cases involving observable defects but in which the vendor did not
inspect and learn of them, he was held not to have any such duty."' 12 The case
I principally relied upon is the leading English case of Longmeid v. Holliday.lS
Professor Farage says, "There is no statement in the report that the defect was
reasonably observable."'" The original report, which Professor Farage did not
have access to when he wrote his article, shows that the plaintiff averred that the
lamp was "cracked and leaky, dangerous, unsafe, and wholly unfit and improper
for use."' 1 It is further stated, "There was evidence that the lamp was defectively
constructed, but no proof that the defendant * * * knew of the defect." The
plaintiff failed because the defendant did not have actual knowledge of the defect.
In discussing Longmeid v. Holliday Professor Bohlen has commented as
follows:
"But the vendor is not bound to inspect the articles which he
sells in order to discover any possible defects which may unfit them
for use. In Longmeid v. Holliday it was contended that ignorance
of a defect in the article sold which could have been discovered by
inspection was equivalent to knowledge thereof. * * * It was held
that there being no actual fraud shown and 'no misfeasance toward
the wife (plaintiff) independently of the contract,' she could not
recover. * * * The defendant, therefore, did not himself or by his
servants create the defective condition, he was not the maker, but the
vendor merely; the case, therefore, is authority only as to the obligation of a vendor to his vendee arising out of the act of transferring
the title and possession of property. To such a relation no higher
duty attaches than to the gratuitous transfer of an article, as by gift
or loan. * * * This case decides, at most, this: that in the absence
of fraud or conscious concealment of a known though latent defect,
the vendor's only liability is upon warranty express or implied, which
being purely consensual, can extend no further than the-vendee. It
11

See authorities cited in note 10.

1289 U. OF PA. L. REv. at p. 323.

16 Exch. 761 (1851).
1445 DIcKINsoN L. REV. at p. 164.
156 Exch. atp. 762.
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settles that there is no duty by a vendor, as such, to inspect a chattel
before he sells it, * 1 *."16
In Bottomley v. Bannister" Lord Justice Greer of the Court of Appeals of
England, after quoting at length from Longmeid v. Holliday, said: "It would
serve no useful purpose to go through the various decisions in detail, but in my
judgment it has not yet been decided by any authority binding on this Court that
a person selling an article which he did not know to be dangerous can be held
liable to a person with whom he has made no contract, by reason of the fact that
reasonable inquiries might have enabled him to discover that the article was in
fact dangerous."' 8
The second case which I cited is Moore v. Jefferson D. & D. Company.' 9 As
I read the case, the court held (1) that the defendant did not owe any duty to
the plaintiff with respect to the unknown gasoline fumes in the oil drum and
(2) that the act of the third person who lighted the match exploding the fumes
was a superseding cause. I concede that this case is not as strong, on its facts,
as the other.
Professor Farage quotes my statement, "there is a considerable body of case
law in which vendors who did not inspect chattels which, by reason of hidden
defects, caused harm, have been absolved from liability.' '20 He then comments,
in italics for emphasis, "No cases are cited at this point.'' 21 I submit that the
seventeen cases which are cited in footnote 80 at the end of the next following
sentence, the five cases which are cited in footnote 82 and the two cases which
are cited in footnote 84 do literally support my quoted statement. In each one of
those twenty-four cases a vendor who did not inspect a chattel which, by reason
of hidden defects in it, caused harm, was absolved from liability.
With respect to the seventeen cases I cited in footnote 80, Professor Farage
comments:
"These, however, obviously do not support the view that a
vendor owes no duty to inspect chattels. At best they hold that the
duty to inspect must not be 'unreasonably' onerous. Indeed, the next
sentence of the article concedes this to be so by saying, 'As to these
cases it may be said that the vendor could not have discovered the
defect even if he had used "reasonable care" in inspecting them.'
16BOHLEN,

STUDIES IN THE LAW OF ToRTs,

17[1932) 1 K.B. 458.
'8Ibid at p. 480. italics
added.
19169 La. 1156, 126 So. 691 (1930).

20S9 U. OF PA. L. REv. at

p.

322.

2145 Dw.iNsoN L. REv. at pp. 163-64.

(1926)

pp. 105-107.

Italics added.
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Up to this point, therefore, Mr. Eldredge fails to cite any holding in
support of his view. He does thereafter refer to dicta in seven cases
upholding his position, at the same time conceding, however, that
other cases use language which might be construed against his position. The dicta are therefore not persuasive either way."
I do not agree that I have failed to cite any holding in support of my view.
I believe that only through the medium of benevolent yearning can the statements
in the "seven cases" be dismissed as dicta.22 Let us examine those cases.
The first case is Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. v. McMath's Admr. 21 It is an important, carefully considered opinion in which the court sharply distinguishes between the situation of a manufacturer and the situation of a vendor. The suit was
to recover damages for the death of a person who was killed when a can of Japan
dryer exploded. The defendant was a paint dealer who had sold the dryer to the
deceased's employer. On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, the court
held that the lower court should have sustained tht defendant's motion for a
directed verdict in its favor. In his opinion Judge Carroll said: "And it is
earnestly insisted that although the evidence may not show that Peaslee-Gaulbert
Company knew the explosive and dangerous quality of the dryer, they are yet
liable if by the exercise or ordinary care they could have known its explosive and
dangerous character." 2'
This language indicates that the plaintiff endeavored on
appeal to hold his verdict and judgment by contending that the defendant's duty
was to discover those dangers which were discoverable "by the eiercise of ordinary
care." The court's answer to this contention is found in the following language:
"But the dealer who purchases and sells an article in common
and general use, in the usual course of trade and business, without
knowledge of its dangerous qualities, is not under a duty to exercise
ordinary care to discover whether it is dangerous or not. He may
take it as he finds it on the market. He is not required to investigate
2ZWith respect to the remaining ten of the seventeen cases I cited in footnote 80 I pointel
out in footnote 81 that some of them contained statements to the effect that the vendor neither
"knew nor by the exercise of ordinary care could have known" of the defect. I also commented
upon the difficulty of evaluating such language. To my mind it is not a statement, by way of
dictum, of a rule of law but a statement of the factual situation confronting the court. In these
cases no inspection had been made of the chattel which caused the injury. The courts did not
say that the vendor was under a duty to inspect, and liable for harm caused by the failure to discover
"observable" defects, and then add that, on the facts, the failure to inspect at all was immaterial
because the required inspection would not have disclosed the particular defect in the case before the
court. The courts held that defendants who had not inspected were not liable for harm caused by
the unknown defect. In analyzing the facts the courts made the factual statement that "ordinary
care" in making an inspection would not have disclosed the defect. I do not believe Professor
Farage is justified in considering these cases as definite dicta imposing a duty to inspect.
2s148 Ky. 265, 146 S.W. 770 (1912).
20i48 Ky. at p. 271.
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its qualities or endeavor to ascertain whether it is dangerous, for the
use intended before he can absolve himself from liability in the event
injury results from its use. There are many necessary articles and
things in common and general use throughout the country that are
dangerous unless used with care, but the dealer who buys and sells
them in the open market in the usual and ordinary course of his
business, and who makes no representations or concealments, and
who does not know that the article is explosive or dangerous in its
ordinary use, is not to be made liable merely because some person is
injured or killed while handling it. The merchant or dealer can
only be made responsible in damages to a party who has no contractual relations with him when the article is imminently or inherently
dangerous in the ordinary use for which it is intended or the use to
which it may reasonably be expected the article will be put or applied;
and, when witk,knowledge of this fact he sells or puts it on the market without giving notice to the purchaser of its dangerous quality,
or, when he represents the thing as being safe for the use intended,
when in fact it is not."2 6
This language cannot be dismissed as a mere dictum. On the record presented to it the court found that the defendant did not have knowledge of the dangerous qualities of the Japan dryer and held that in the absence of such knowledge
he was under no tort liability whatever.
In Belcher v. Goff Bros.26 the plaintiff appealed from an adverse judgment and
the principal assignments of error were to the refusal of the plaintiff's points for
charge. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court had properly
rejected these points for charge and said:
"If the seller had known, before the sale to the plaintiff, that
the kerosene was mixed with gasoline, and failed to disclose it, and
that was the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff, without
negligence on her part, then the defendants would have been liable.
But the evidence does not support that conclusion, and the instructions tendered by the plaintiff were fatally defective in failing to state
that the defendants knowingly sold to the plaintiff a mixture of gasoline and coal oil, or gasoline for coal oil." 2 7

25148 Ky. at pp. 274-75. Italics added.
26145 Va. 448, 134 S.E. 588 (1926).
27
Va. at p. 450. "Knowingly" italicized in original report. Other italics added.
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In Tourte v. Horton Manufacturing Co.2" the court affirmed a judgment of
nonsuit and said, "The basis of the liability is the seller's superior knowledge and
29
concealment of the latent defects."
In Noble v. Sears Roebuck and Co.30 the case arose on the defendant's demurrer to the complaint. Judge Bowen said: "The question presented on this
demurrer is whether or not a seller of an article of merchandise manufactured by
another, not known to the seller to be imminently or inherently dangerous to the
life or limb of any one who may use it for the purpose for which it is intended, is
liable to a third person for injuries resulting from manufacturing defects."'
Having stated this question Judge Bowen answered it in the following language: "A seller of an article of known or described manufacture, manufactured
by another, is not liable to the purchaserfor damages resulting from latent defects
when the article is not known to the seller to be inherently dangerous to the life
2
or limb of any one who may use it for the purpose for which it is intended."
In Tsbell v. Biederman Furniture Co.33 the lower court sustained the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint. The plaintiff appealed from the
judgment on the demurrer. The plaintiff had been injured by the collapse of a
bed which had been purchased from the defendant by her husband. The complaint averred that "a piece on which boards or slats of this bed rested was weak
and contained a knot and was insufficiently attached." 84 The court referred to
"a distinction between the liability on the part of the manufacturer of articles
* 0* and the liability which might attach to a retail dealer of the two classes of
articles," and then quoted with approval the statement from Corpus Juris that "A
distinction between a dealer and a manufacturer is sometimes noted, and it is held
that a dealer is under no duty or obligation to examine the articles which he sells
to ascertain whether there are defects therein, and that he is not liable for an injury
arising from such defects where he had no actual knowledge thereof." 85
28108 Cal. App. 22, 290 Pac. 919 (1930).

29108 Cal. App. at p. 24. The court also said: "The motion for nonsuit was made upon the
ground that the evidence showed no legal liability upon respondent's part. The motion was properly granted. The rule of law involved is found in 24 Ruling Case Law, page 509, which reads:
'The dealer who purchases and sells an article in common and general use in the usual course of
trade and business, without knowledge of its dangerous qualities, is not under a duty to exercise
ordinary care to discover whether it is dangerous or not.' In 45 Corpus Juris, 893, we find- the
same rule stated: 'A dealer is under no duty or obligation to examine the articles which he sells to
ascertain whether there are defects therein, and . . . is not liable for an injury alising from such
defects where he had no actual knowledge thereof'."
8012 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Wash. 1935).
811bid at p. 181. Italics added.
321bid at p. 181. Italics added.
33115 S.W. (2d) 46 (Mo. App. 1938).

34Ibid at p. 47.
85

1bid at p. 48.
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It is particularly interesting to compare Professor Farage's statement that I
fail to cite "any holding" denying a duty of inspection with the very recent decision
of the Court of Appeals of Louisiana in the case of Boyd v. 1. C. Penny Co., Inc.8 6
The plaintiff purchased a dress from the defendant which contained some deleterious substance which injured her skin. The court below dismissed her action
and this was affirmed on appeal. The court said:
"Under our interpretation of the law applicable to this case, we
do not consider it necessary to determine whther the dress contained
any injurious substances and that the irritation and rash on plaintiff's
body were caused by these deleterious and poisonous substances, for
the reason that, if these facts be conceded, it is shown that defendant
had no knowledge of any defects and vices of the article sold by it
in the regular course of its retail business." 37
The court then quoted from an article of the Louisiana Civil Code which expressly
restricts liability, and added, "The liability of the seller who does not know of the
vices and defects in the article sold is liable only for the return of the price and
the expenses of the sale." s8 This limited statutory liability can hardly be considered a tort liability for a "negligent" failure to inspect.
Two other cases which I discussed in my former article under the heading
"Honest Misrepresentation of Chattel's Safety,''1 9 and of which Professor Farage
says nothing, (except for his preliminary statement40 that he has "no fault to find"
with the views expounded under that subheading) deserve notice. In State to
use v. Consolidated Gas, E. L. & P. Co.4 1 the court sustained a demurrer to the
declaration. It averred that defendant supplied plaintiffs with gas, that it sold
to them a certain gas heater and represented that it "could be used with perfect
safety," that "the warranty" was untrue and that "the heater so sold was defective"
in that it produced carbon monoxide which killed plaintiffs' son. The theory was
that defendant was liable for harm caused by breach of warranty of fitness "for
the particular purpose for which (the heater) was sold." The court held that,
as the son had not been a party to the contract of sale he could not have sued on the
warranty and therefore, under the Maryland death statute, the parents could not
maintain the action. The court thought that the facts averred did not constitute
the basis for any recovery in tort on a theory of negligence. The court said:
"The declaration here does not allege that the defendant was
86195 So. 87 (La.

App. 1940).

87lbid at pp. 88-89. Italics added.
8B1bid at p. 89.
8989 U. oF PA. L. REv. at pp. 318-320.
4045 DicK sNSN L. REv. at p. 159.
41146 Md. 390, 126 Ad. 105 (1924).
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the manufacturer of the gas heater which is alleged to have caused
the death of the infant, and the authorities, in this State and elsewhere, which hold that a manufacturer is liable for injury to strangers
resulting from the sale of articles inherently dangerous, do not apply
.to cases like the one under consideration. * * *
"As above stated, the defendant here was not the manufacturer;
it was the vendor of an article not in itself inherently dangerous,
which it sold in the same condition as received from its vendor, and
there is no allegation of any knowledge on its part that same was not
perfectly safe, nor any allegation that the article was purchased from
42
an irresponsible or incompetent manufacturer."
It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Maryland held that even the defendant's positive representation that the heater was perfectly safe did not establish
a tort liability in the absence of an averment that the defendant knew it "was not
perfectly safe."
In Camden Fire Insurance Co. v. Peterman45 the court reversed a judgment
for the plaintiff insurer, which had paid a fire loss and was suing as assignee of
the property claim. Defendant sold a gasoline range to the insured, after showing
it to him in the store and saying it was "foolproof." Defendant's servants delivered the stove, set it up, and lighted the burner. Flames shot up, a defective
control valve prevented shutting off the flames and the customer's house was destroyed by fire. The defective valve was not an "apparent defect in the stove as
it sat in the store," 44 but it was quite apparent the minute the operation of the stove
was tested by lighting it, as the defendant's servants so quickly discovered. In
denying liability the court said:
"In the case at bar the defendant sold a gasoline stove, which as
it remained in the store without gasoline in it was not a dangerous
article; the defects that it had were hidden and unknown to the seller
and could not be readily ascertained without the use of gasoline. It
was sold in the condition in which the buyer purchased it from the
manufacturer without any suspicion upon the part of the seller of its
defects. Under such circumstances the seller may not be called to
respond in damages for the resultant injury, ** °."46
It may be noted that the defect could have been "readily ascertained" with "the use
of gasoline" as the event proved.
42146 Md. at pp. 397-98. Italics
48278 Mich. 615, 270 N.W. 807
44278 Mich. 615, 270 N.W. at p.
15278 Mich, 615, 270 N.W. at p.

added.
(1937).
808.
808. (Italics added).
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Professor Farage endeavors to avoid the weight of some of the cases by arguing
that they have merely perpetuated the now discarded theory of Huset v. 1. I. Case
Threshing Machine Co. 46 It seems to me that Professor Farage is confusing the
liability of the manufacturer with that of the vendor of a chattel. The early view
was that, in the absence of privity of contract, neither the manufacturer nor the
vendor was under any liability to a person who was injured by a defective chattel.
So far as the manufacturer's liability is concerned that view, which was forcefully
stated by Judge Sanborn in the Huset case, is now pretty thoroughly discredited,
and rightly so. The recent cases emphasize that the basis of the manufacturer's
liability is his active negligence in carelessly creating a dangerous instrumentality.
As I pointed out in my preceding article, the same argument cannot be advanced
with respect to the vendor of the chattel. 47 In Judge Sanborn's opinion he stated
three so-called exceptions to the then "general rule" of non-liability in the absence
of privity of contract. One of them dealt with the liability of a vendor who sold
a dangerous chattel knowing of the defect. It is significant to note that the
exception only applied where there was actual knowledge and in the Huset case
Judge Sanborn stressed the fact that the declaration had averred actual knowledge.
It was for that reason, and only for that reason, that the declaration was held to
state a cause of action. In that case, however, the defendant vendor was also
the manufacturer.
With respect to the non-liability of a vendor who is not a manufacturer or other
creator of the dangerous instrumentality, I doubt that the Huset case is discredited.
The statement in the Huset case of the vendor's non-liability in the absence of
knowledge is merely a restatement of what had been decided much earlier in Longmeid v. Holliday." The extent of the liability of the vendor to his own customer (where privity of contract exists) is in some confusion. Ht is undoubtedly
under a contractual liability to the purchaser where there is a breach of contract.
In some situations he may be liable for breach of implied warranty of wholesomeness or of merchantability. Most of the actions based upon such breach of
warranty are brought in assumpsit. To the extent that a breach of implied warranty is looked upon as a tort, the court is imposing an absolute liability and in
no sense a liability based upon negligence. I do not believe that a tort duty of
exercising "due care" by making an inspection of a chattel, which is reasonably
believed to be harmless when used in its normal and proper way, is imposed upon
a vendor even with respect to his own customer. Professor Bohlen thought that
under the law as announced in Longmeid v. Holliday "the vendor's only liability

46120 Fed. 865 (C.C.A. 8th, 1903).
4789 U. oF PA. L. REv. at pp. 306-07.
48Note 13.
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In my article which Professor

Farage criticizes I pointed out that there are two decisions in New York, in the
Appellate Division, and one in Pennsylvania which take a contrary view. 50
Professor Farage apparently agrees with me that the two New York cases
were wrongly decided on their facts because he says "His criticism of the first two
of these cases, on the ground that the particular inspection required in the specific
instances was 'unreasonably' onerous, may be conceded to be sound."' ' But Professor Farage continues, "That criticism in itself, however, does not invalidate the
argument for imposing at least a 'reasonable' duty." I do not follow this reasoning. To my mind the decision of a court is either sound upon the record presented
to it or it is unsound. If Professor Farage agrees that the New York decisions
were decided wrongly upon the records presented, I do not see how he can go on
to argue that they should still be accepted as authority for imposing liability on
some other set of facts. If Professor Farage agrees that the vendors in' the two
New York cases should not have been under any duty of inspection on the facts
of those cases then, by his own reasoning, the court's decision to the contrary is
either unsound or should be considered a mere dictum. Indeed, I consider those
two cases my prize exhibits of the trouble a court is likely to get into once it formulates the rule that there is some general duty of inspection and that, where the
facts or inferences are not clear, the issue of compliance with that duty must be
settled in the jury box.
So much for the authorities.

Professor Farage also says:

"One more argument, which Mr. Eldredge advances in favor of
a rule requiring the vendor to have 'actual knowledge' as a condition
to liability, must be considered. He says:
'Further, the issue of the vendor's knowledge is easily understandable while a rule of law requiring inspection for observable
defects but not for unobservable defects draws a line very difficult
of application. Does observable mean visible to the eye from the
outside? Does it mean observable only if you look for it seeking
danger, or observable by the casual glance given in the usual unpacking and handling? Does it require the removal of easily removable parts to see what is visible underneath? Does it mean
visible as you view the chattel from a normal standing or sitting
posture or visible as you get down and look all over it? Does it
49

BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS, (1926)
5089 U. or PA. L. Rsv. at pp. 330-333.
5145 DICKINSON L. REv, at p. 166.

p. 107. Italics added.
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mean detectable by the sense of feel, or smell, or hearing, or taste
as well as sight? Must the vendor look at, handle, smell, taste and
listen to the chattel? Must he palpate the chattel inside to feel
the defect? Must he tap it with a handy hammer to hear the defect? If an equally simple and not inconvenient test, such as using
litmus paper, will make the defect observable by sight, as palpation makes it obsrvable by feeling, is this required?'
The difficulties posed by these questions seem awe-inspiring until it
is recalled that by far the greatest part of the law of negligence rests
upon the conveniently vague formula that the conduct required of
members of society must conform to the 'standard of the reasonable
man.' In advance it is usually impossible to give legal advice as to
the precise forms of conduct required in order to avoid tort liabil52
ity."
I do not think this is a satisfactory answer to my questions. It is one thing to
say to a man that he must answer for his active conduct which creates a foreseeable
risk of harm if it falls below "the conveniently vague* *standard of the reasonable
man"; i. e. if the utility of the activity is outweighed by the magnitude of the
risk. 6 But in the case of the vendor, who neither knows nor suspicions that the
chattel he sells is dangerously defective, he is not doing anything which, on the
facts known to him, contains a foreseeable risk of harm. The duty of inspection,
if imposed, is a duty which requires the vendor to do something.54 If a vendor
is to be compelled to do something in order to escape liability the law should be
sufficiently definite to enable the vendor to know when he has done enough to
satisfy the required standard. The law does not permit a man to be convicted of
the "crime" of violating a statute which contains a standard so vague onL cannot
tell in advance what is required in the way of compliance. 5 5 The fact that certainty in the law is not always possible (and that some vaguely defined affirmative
duties do exist) does not detract from the fact that it is highly desirable, and
sometimes essential in order to avoid unfairness. In this situation "the knowne
certaintie of the law" is the only "safetie of all" vendors. If Professor Farage
desires to compel vendors to do some inspecting common fairness requires him to
state with some particularity how much is enough.

52ibid at p. 169.
3
54

RESTATEMENT, TORTS, (1934) sec. 291.
Courts are reluctant to impose such duties.

See REsTATEmSNT, ToRTs, (1934) sec. 314.
This reluctance seems to be the basic reason behind a deciion such as Zayc v. John Hancock M. L.

Ins. Co., 338 Pa. 426, 13 A. (2d) 34 (1940), holding that the failure to accept a pending life
insurance
application within "a reasonable time" is not tortious.
55 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) and note 83 L. ed. 893.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Suppose the owner of a retail hardware store consults his lawyer and says,
"I hear that unless I do some inspecting of my stock I may be held liable for substantial damages. Tell me what I should do." The lawyer replies, "You must
conform to the 'conveniently vague formula' of the reasonable man. Whether
you have conformed in a particular instance cannot be determined finally until the
court of last resort of this state has announced its judgment, and that judgment
may require you to pay out a lot of money."
Who would blame the client (unacquainted as he is with the sacred mysteries
of the law, but having some familiarity with Dickens) for paraphrasing Mr.
Bumble and retorting, with a slight show of asperity, "If the law says no more
than that, the law is a ass."
PHILADELPHIA, PA.

LAURENCE

H.

ELDREDGE

NOTE
I have read Professor Farage's manuscript which is printed immediately following this article
I have no desire to prolong an already too extended discussion. For clarification I merely add the
following footnotes to what he says as final comment.
(a) The word "catastrophe" was used in the sense in which it is used in Restatement, Torts,
§ 293, comment d, where it is said: "Higher duties of care are imposed in the use of * * chattels
* * where carelessness is likely to lead to some catastrophe which will involve in one common
destruction a number of persons rather than a single person." (See Professor Farage's article immediately following. Page 283, line 19).
(b) The context shows I did not "principally rely" on Longmeid v. Holliday, in general, but
only as support for one sentence to which the case was cited as a footnote. (See Professor Farage's
article. Page 284, line 20).
(c) "Negligence" involves the idea of a breach of duty. If there is no duty to inspect or
otherwise check up there is no proof of "any negligence." (See Professor Farage's article. Page
290, line 7).
(d) Where there is "contractual privity" there may be liability for breach of warranty, although
there is no duty to inspect. In the absence of such "privity" there may be no basis for any
liability. (See Professor Farage's article. Page 290, line 33).
(e) There may be, I suppose, a "reasonably observable latent defect" to quote Professor
Farage's "conveniently vague" words without such defect being "obvious." (See Professor Farage's
article. Footnote 13).
(f) The quotation showed Professor Bohlen's analysis of the holding in Logmeid v. Holliday.
A possible change of "views" does not alter the analysis of the case. (See Professor Farage's article.
Footnote 14).
(g) I did not consider it necessary, in the second article, to make again all the points of the
first. (See Professor Farage's article. The last sentence of footnote 14).
(h)
I reiterate: The language is not definite. (See Professor Farage's article. Footnote 22)
(i) Section 388 deals with the liability of a supplier of a chattel known to be dangerous.
This type of case was discussed at length in my original article and in Professor Farage's first
article he expressed his complete approval with what I said. I do not understand how Section
388 "'Rejects the doctrine of the Huset case." Judge Sanborn recognized, in substance, a rule of
law stated in Section 388 and announced it as his third exception to the so-called general rule of
non-liability. Indeed, the demurrer to the complaint was specifically overruled upon the authority
of this third exception. (See Professor Farage's article. Footnote 43).
(j) The other two exceptions have nothing to do with a vendor. (See Professor Farage's
article. Footnote 45).
L. H, E.

